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  1 
Contracts That Impede Entry by More 
Efficient Telecommunications Rivals 
Stanley M. Besen,* Bridger M. Mitchell† 
Abstract 
Incumbent local telecommunications companies provide 
data services to business customers through “special access” 
contracts containing loyalty terms and conditions, including 
minimum purchase requirements, long contract terms, and 
“all-or-nothing” provisions. When these conditions are not met, 
customers face a wide range of “taxes” on purchases from rival 
suppliers, including both monetary payments and the loss of 
valuable benefits. The incumbent suppliers have large market 
shares, so that the contracts are especially likely to discourage 
entry by more efficient rivals. Regulatory actions by the FCC 
would have prohibited some provisions of loyalty contracts, but 
they would not have barred contract conditions based on mar-
ket shares or imposed penalties based on suppliers’ expected 
revenues, and even those pro-competitive regulations were 
subsequently withdrawn. As a result, terms and conditions in 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC) special access con-
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INTRODUCTION 
Terms and conditions in contracts between buyers and 
sellers may impede more efficient rivals from entering and 
competing with incumbent firms.1 For some time, economists 
have been analyzing these effects.2 For example, Aghion and 
Bolton analyze “whether optimal contracts between buyers and 
sellers deter entry.”3 They go on to note that these contracts 
“sometimes block the entry of firms that may be more efficient 
than the incumbent seller. Entry is blocked because . . . an en-
trant must either wait until contracts expire, or induce the cus-
                                                            
 1. See generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a 
Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 389 (1987) (arguing that long-term 
exclusive contracts create a barrier to entry). 
 2. See, e.g., Ran Jing & Ralph A. Winter, Exclusionary Contracts, 30 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 833, 834 (2013) (“[E]xclusivity contracts . . . protect the 
incumbent’s position as a monopolist or a dominant firm . . . . By offering 
downstream buyers long-term contracts, the incumbent makes entry less 
profitable for the potential entrants . . . .”); Ilya R. Segal & Michael 
D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 296, 297 (2000) 
(concluding that an “incumbent’s ability to deal with buyers sequentially 
strengthens its ability to exclude”); see also Luis M. B. Cabral, Staggered 
Contracts, Market Power, and Welfare 7–9, 11 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Econ. Policy 
Research, Discussion Paper No. DP10095, 2014) (arguing that exclusive, long, 
staggered contracts create a barrier to entry). 
 3. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 1, at 388. 
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tomers to break their contract with the incumbent by paying 
their liquidated damages.”4 
Greenlee and Reitman have observed that “purchase 
requirements, coupled with a loyalty discount for buyers who 
comply with the purchase terms, can function as exclusionary 
behavior to the detriment of rival firms and competition.”5 
Carlton, Greenlee, and Waldman note that “tying the 
competitive good to the monopoly good can deny necessary 
scale to the rival firm, leading the rival firm to exit and 
allowing the monopolist to set a higher price for the 
complementary good.”6 They go on to note that “[i]f tying by the 
monopolist serves to lower the rival’s output, then the 
anticipation of such tying tomorrow can lower the rival’s R&D 
expenditure today and in this way increase the rival’s marginal 
cost in subsequent periods.”7 
The antitrust authorities’ interest in these types of 
contracts is reflected in papers by Fiona Scott-Morton, then the 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice, and Joseph Farrell, then the 
Director of the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of 
Economics. Scott-Morton analyzes “contracts that reference 
rivals,” an example of which is a contract under which a buyer 
“will receive a discount on incremental units, or perhaps all 
purchased units, if it buys [a given percentage] or more of its 
needs from one seller.”8 She notes that contracts that reference 
rivals “may create a competitive problem unless the provision 
serves a particular pro-competitive purpose.”9 Similarly, 
Farrell analyzes “loyalty” contracts in which buyers obtain 
lower prices from a dominant firm if they agree to make at 
                                                            
 4. Id. at 389. 
 5. Patrick Greenlee & David Reitman, Competing with Loyalty Discounts 
2 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. 04-2, 2004) 
(revised Jan. 7, 2006). 
 6. Dennis W. Carlton, Patrick Greenlee, & Michael Waldman, Assessing 
the Anticompetitive Effects of Multiproduct Pricing, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 587, 
602 (2008). 
 7. Id. at 603. 
 8. Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t Justice, Contracts that Reference Rivals 3 (Apr. 5, 2012) (transcript 
available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.pdf). 
 9. Id. at 4. 
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least a minimum percentage of their purchases from that 
firm.10 
This article employs the economic theory of loyalty 
contracts to analyze the terms and conditions included by 
ILECs in their contracts for the sale of special access service in 
a market that provides “dedicated high-capacity connections 
used by businesses and institutions to transmit their voice and 
data traffic,”11 and which, according to the FCC, has revenues 
that “could exceed $75 billion annually.”12 The ILECs have 
attempted to achieve “loyalty” from their special access 
customers through a wide range of contractual devices. Some 
involve monetary penalties and others involve withdrawal of 
benefits, such as limiting the ability of a customer to substitute 
one purchase from the ILEC for another from the ILEC if the 
customer shifts some purchases to a rival.13 Moreover, although 
these contracts typically have minimum purchase 
requirements, they often contain other loyalty features 
including lengthy contract terms and requirements that 
customers obtain all of their purchases of services of a given 
type from the ILEC regardless of the geographic areas in which 
the services are purchased.14 Thus, the terms and conditions in 
ILEC special access contracts provide rich and varied examples 
of the use of loyalty contracts in practice. 
                                                            
 10. See id. at 9 (citing Joseph Farrell, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Bureau of Econ., Problems with Loyalty Pricing (Sept. 23, 2011)). 
 11. Special Access Data Collection Overview, FCC.GOV, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/special-access-data-collection-overview-0 (last 
updated Feb. 27, 2014). Elsewhere, the FCC notes that “[s]pecial access 
services encompass all services that do not use local switches; these include 
services that employ dedicated facilities that run directly between the end 
user and an interexchange carrier’s (IXC) point of presence, where an IXC 
connects its network with the local exchange carrier’s (LEC) network, or 
between two discrete user locations.” Special Access for Price Cap Local 
Exchange Carriers, 27 FCC Rcd. 16318, 16319 n.1 (Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter 
FCC Report and Order]. 
 12. Business Data Services in an Internet Protocol Environment, Tariff 
Investigation Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd. 
4723, 4743, ¶ 44 (Apr. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Tariff Investigation Order]. 
 13. See id. at 4764–90 (discussing ILEC contract terms and conditions). 
 14. See id. 
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I. FCC REGULATION OF SPECIAL ACCESS SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
In 2005, the FCC began “a broad examination of the 
regulatory framework to apply to price cap local exchange 
carriers’ . . . interstate special access services.”15 Much of the 
focus of the ensuing proceedings has been on the rates charged 
by ILECs.16 ILECs claim that the competition to which they are 
subject justifies either deregulation of these rates or a 
substantial lessening of regulation, while purchasers of special 
access services argue the reverse.17 Although some have 
suggested that provisions in ILEC special access contracts and 
tariffs have limited the competition faced by ILECs,18 the FCC 
initially took the view that because “investments were location 
specific, the entrant incurred sunk costs, making it less likely 
that the incumbent could successfully use exclusionary 
strategies to drive the entrant from the market.”19 As a result, 
the FCC concluded in 2009 “that sunk investment in the 
facilities sufficient to discourage exclusionary pricing behavior 
would also preclude anticompetitive volume and term 
discounts.”20 
Subsequently, however, the FCC began to take note of the 
growing academic attention to “loyalty” contracts and of the 
acceptance by the antitrust authorities of the learning from 
that literature.21 The Commission began to recognize that, 
although there are other potential suppliers of special access 
services, their ability to compete to provide services was 
severely limited by the ILECs’ use of contracts that made it 
difficult for buyers to shift a portion of their purchases to 
                                                            
 15. Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, 20 FCC 
Rcd. 1994, 1995 (Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Special Access NPRM]. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 2002–03. 
 18. See, e.g., Sprint Nextel Corporation, Comment Letter on Special 
Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, 37–42 (Jan. 19, 2010), 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7020382081.pdf. 
 19. Special Access NPRM, supra note 15, at 2029 (footnote omitted). 
 20. Parties Asked to Comment on Analytic Framework Necessary to 
Resolve Issues in the Special Access NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd. 13638, 13643 (Nov. 
5, 2009) (citing Pricing Flexibility Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 14221, 14263–64). 
 21. See, e.g., Investigation of Certain Price Cap Local Exchange Carrier 
Business Data Services Tariff Pricing Plans, 30 FCC Rcd. 11417, 11425–27 
nn.53–54 (Oct. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Initiating Order] (discussing under 
footnote 53 the case law and under footnote 54 the economic literature). 
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competing carriers.22 Even when contracts do not explicitly 
require customers to make a very large percentage of their 
special access purchases from the ILECs, they often have the 
same effect because they condition discounts, the avoidance of 
penalties, or the availability of benefits23 on this percentage.24 
Moreover, the FCC recently noted that its “predictive judgment 
that ‘irreversible, sunk investment by competitors’ would make 
it ‘less likely that an incumbent will try to use volume and term 
discounts to lock in customers’ . . . [was] subsequently found 
not to be borne out by marketplace developments.”25 Finally, 
the FCC observed that 
[w]hile non-incumbent LEC affiliated [sic] competitive LECs – 
including, importantly, cable providers – are making great strides in 
competing to sell Ethernet services, data . . . show that these carriers 
serve no more than [twenty-five] percent of buildings with business 
data services demand over their own networks. Further, the data 
show that the vast majority of off-net services provided by competitive 
LECs is provided through either incumbent LEC leased facilities or 
incumbent LEC UNEs [Unbundled Network Elements].26 
In its 2016 special access decision, the FCC took action 
with respect to some of the terms and conditions in ILEC 
special pricing plans. It stated: 
We conclude that “all-or-nothing” provisions that are included in 
certain of the pricing plans under investigation are unjust and 
unreasonable practices. We direct the incumbent LECs to remove 
those provisions from the relevant pricing plans and submit tariff 
revisions consistent with this Order. We further conclude that certain 
of the shortfall and early termination penalties contained in the 
pricing plans are unjust and unreasonable practices to the extent that 
the penalties exceed expectation damages and direct their removal 
from the relevant pricing plans under investigation and the 
submission of tariff revisions consistent with this Order.27 
                                                            
 22. Id. ¶ 7, at 11420–21. 
 23. As discussed below, these penalties can involve an increase in the unit 
price, a fixed dollar payment, or a denial of benefits. See infra, note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. Some writers treat loyalty and explicit market share discounts as 
equivalent. See, e.g., J. M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, THE 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, at 9. We intend the term “loyalty contracts” to 
apply to any provisions that condition price reductions to the acceptance by 
the purchaser of limitations on its behavior. 
 25. Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 92, at 4763. 
 26. Id. ¶ 91 (footnote omitted). 
 27. Id. ¶ 88, at 4762. “‘All-or-nothing’ provisions . . . require customers to 
commit all their relevant in-service purchases . . . to a single pricing plan, 
which limits the ability of customers to allocate their purchases across 
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Significantly, the FCC did not take action on two key 
“loyalty” contract provisions: percentage commitments, under 
which a buyer obtains a lower price or other benefits only if it 
agrees to purchase a very large percentage of a given service 
from the ILEC,28 and term commitments,29 under which a 
buyer obtains a lower price or other benefits only if it agrees to 
purchase a given service from the ILEC for a relatively long 
time.30 Instead, the FCC designated these provisions for 
further investigation.31 
This article (i) describes the terms and conditions in ILEC 
special access contracts and tariffs; (ii) analyzes the effects of 
these provisions on competition between ILECs and rival 
suppliers of special access service; (iii) places this analysis in 
the context of the economic literature on “loyalty” contracts; 
and (iv) describes the actions taken by the FCC in 2016 to 
ameliorate some of the adverse competitive effects of the terms 
and conditions of ILEC special access contracts. Although we 
find that some of the FCC’s actions would have been likely to 
increase the competition faced by ILECs, we also conclude that 
they fell short of a complete removal of the barriers created for 
ILEC competitors by the terms and conditions in ILEC special 
access tariffs and contracts, and, in any event, these actions 
have since been reversed. 
                                                            
different plans.” Id. ¶ 95, at 4765 (footnotes omitted). “Shortfall fees are 
charges assessed on a purchaser . . . if its purchases fall below a percentage-
based or other volume commitment . . . as a precondition for obtaining a 
pricing plan’s discount or circuit portability benefit.” Id. ¶ 116, at 4773 
(footnotes omitted). “Early termination fees . . . are charges assessed on a 
purchaser . . . when the purchaser terminates its use of a circuit or circuits 
prior to the expiration of the . . . service term.” Id. ¶ 142, at 4785 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 28. Id. ¶ 462, at 4894 (footnote omitted) (“Percentage commitments are 
requirements included in some incumbent LEC tariff pricing plans that 
require customers to commit to buy, over the term of the plan, a high 
percentage of the amount of services they elect to purchase when initiating or 
renewing purchases through a tariff pricing plan.”). 
 29. Id. ¶ 469, at 4895–96 (footnote omitted) (“We declined to address term 
commitments in the Tariff Investigation Order . . . .”). 
 30. Id. ¶ 467, at 4895. 
 31. Id. ¶¶ 465–66, 469, at 4895–96. 
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II. THE BASICS OF ILEC SPECIAL ACCESS LOYALTY 
CONTRACTS 
The provisions in ILEC special access contracts take a 
number of forms.32 Some provide rate discounts for a single 
circuit only if a customer commits to a minimum contract term 
for that circuit.33 Others condition circuit portability—the 
ability to terminate one special access circuit and replace it 
with another without incurring a termination penalty—on a 
customer’s commitment to maintain a significant share of its 
historic purchase levels from the ILEC.34 Still others penalize a 
customer if it does not commit to increase its minimum volume 
commitment to the ILEC by including a large proportion of the 
growth in the customer’s purchases from the ILEC.35 Many 
special access contracts contain a combination of these types of 
provisions.36 Although the precise form of these contract 
provisions differ, they all have the same intent and effect: to 
encourage customers of special access to purchase a very large 
share of their special access requirements from the ILEC, or, 
equivalently, to discourage these customers from purchasing a 
significant share of these requirements from ILEC rivals. 
                                                            
 32. We provide specific examples of provisions in ILEC special access 
contracts and tariffs below. 
 33. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-80, FCC NEEDS 
TO IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO MONITOR AND DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF 
COMPETITION IN DEDICATED ACCESS SERVICES 31 (2006) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT] (describing AT&T’s “severe termination penalties”). 
 34. See, e.g., PETER BLUHM & ROBERT LOUBE, NAT’L REGULATORY 
RESEARCH INST., COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN SPECIAL ACCESS MARKETS 74 (rev. 
ed. 2009) (describing the “portability commitment” option that AT&T-SBC’s 
offers with its “Term Payment Plan”). 
 35. See, e.g., Reply Declaration of Joseph Farrell on Behalf of CompTel, 
Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 
05-25, ¶ 18 (Jul. 29, 2005) [hereinafter “Farrell Reply Declaration”], 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6518716219.pdf (explaining that a customer on 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company’s (SBC’s) DS1 Term Payment Plan “is 
likely to [increase its plan commitment level] given the ‘growth penalty’ that 
applies if it does not promptly commit its unexpected demand growth to 
SBC.”). 
 36. In addition, some ILEC contract provisions condition discounts, 
benefits, or the avoidance of penalties on the customer’s commitment to 
purchase a minimum quantity of services other than special access channel 
termination or of services other than special access services (i.e., services other 
than either channel terminations or mileage). Although we explain below that 
such provisions can be problematic, these are characterized more accurately 
as tying arrangements rather than loyalty provisions. 
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Others who have analyzed competition in the market for 
special access services have reached this basic conclusion. For 
example, a National Regulatory Research Institute study 
concluded “that a combination of terms in discount plans may 
be allowing ILECs unreasonably to cement their market power 
by limiting the ability of buyers to shift special access circuits 
to competitors who may have better products, lower prices, or 
both.”37 Similarly, the United States Government 
Accountability Office concluded that 
[t]hese types of contracts may inhibit choosing competitive 
alternatives because the customer does not receive the applicable 
discount, credit, or incentive if the revenue targets are not met and 
additional penalties may also apply. Unless a competitor can meet the 
customer’s entire demand, the customer has an incentive to stay with 
the incumbent and to purchase additional circuits from the 
incumbent, rather than switch to a competitor or purchase a portion 
of their demand from a competitor—even if the competitor is less 
expensive.38 
Moreover, the fact that some carriers “freely” choose these 
restrictive long-term arrangements is simply an artifact of the 
very unattractive terms at which the ILECs offer month-to-
month service.39 As Farrell observed, 
[i]t is a tempting fallacy to think that optional discount plans 
cannot be harmful simply because consumers select them voluntarily. 
The claim that voluntary discounts cannot harm consumers assumes 
that basic month-to-month rates are not affected, but in fact, once an 
ILEC has contracted with some of its customers for a percentage 
discount off the month-to-month tariff, it has an incentive to raise the 
latter above the level that it would have chosen otherwise.40 
Although the types of contracts offered by ILECs are 
similar to those offered in other, more competitive markets, 
this does not mean that the effects of ILEC contracts are 
benign. ILECs have large market shares and are much larger 
suppliers than their competitors.41 Moreover, potential 
entrants face substantial barriers to entry into the market for 
special access services.42 Indeed, ILECs are the types of 
dominant firms for which the use of loyalty contracts is 
                                                            
 37. BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 34, at 96 (emphasis added). 
 38. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 30 (emphasis added). 
 39. Farrell Reply Declaration, supra note 35, ¶ 21. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, at 4818–22 (explaining 
data on market shares and suppliers). 
 42. Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 3, at 4725. 
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especially likely to be anticompetitive. Greenlee and Reitman 
have observed that loyalty discounts are “of particular concern 
when the firm offering loyalty discounts is much larger than its 
rivals.”43 Similarly, Scott-Morton has noted that “the settings 
where [such contracts] are most likely to harm consumers and 
competition involve dominant firms possessing market power 
and a high market share.”44 Finally, even Zenger, who believes 
that loyalty discounts are generally not anticompetitive, notes, 
“If a dominant firm is in a position to foreclose such a 
substantial part of the market that the output of the smaller 
competitors is suppressed below the minimum efficient scale of 
production, retroactive rebates can cause anticompetitive harm 
by jeopardizing the viability of the dominant firm’s 
competitors.” 45 
A. HOW LOYALTY CONTRACTS WORK 
As many commentators have observed, contracts that 
require a customer to make a very large fraction of its 
purchases from one supplier in order to obtain a significant 
discount, avoid a significant penalty, or reap a significant 
benefit, effectively serve as a “tax” on purchases from 
competitors of that supplier.46 A customer will take this “tax” 
into account when deciding whether to purchase from a 
competitor.47 
Even a small increase in price can represent a significant 
per-unit “tax” on purchases from the rival if the customer 
continues to make a large share of its purchases from the 
dominant firm.48 In the case of special access services, the 
result is that rival offerings are uncompetitive, ILEC market 
                                                            
 43. Greenlee & Reitman, supra note 5, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 44. Scott-Morton, supra note 8, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 45. Hans Zenger, Loyalty Rebates and the Competitive Process, 8 J. OF 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 717, 749 (2012) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 46. See id. at 735. 
 47. As we note below, the effects of the penalties are the same whether 
they involve fixed dollar payments or rollbacks of previous discounts. See 
Greenlee & Reitman, supra note 5, at 5 n.8 (referring to the first type of 
contract as involving “dollar-one”, “all-unit”, or “rollback” discounts” and 
noting that they “effectively increase the gain to a customer near the margin 
for meeting the target, relative to incremental discounts”). See also infra note 
54. 
 48. See Scott-Morton, supra note 8, at 9 (“In essence, the loyalty discount 
functions like a tax on purchases from the rival.”). 
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power is increased, and ILECs are able to raise prices.49 
Moreover, if a customer must commit to a high percentage in 
order to obtain more favorable rates, terms, and conditions the 
commitment requirement has much the same effect as an 
explicit prohibition on purchases from rivals.50 Indeed, at 
times, ILEC loyalty contracts have even induced customers to 
purchase more than the number of special access circuits that 
they need.51 We understand that at least one carrier has 
occasionally purchased “circuits to nowhere” in order to meet 
volume or revenue commitments and thereby avoid paying 
shortfall penalties.52 This behavior suggests that the marginal 
price of these circuits was negative, i.e., that the total costs of 
the customer were actually lower when it purchased additional 
circuits that it did not use.53 
One form of the “tax” or “penalty” under a loyalty contract 
is a so-called “all-units,” “first-dollar,” or “rollback” discount 
plan, under which a buyer forfeits the per-unit discount on all 
of the units that it continues to purchase from the firm offering 
the loyalty discount (that is, the discount is “rolled back”) if its 
purchases from that firm fall below its purchase commitment.54 
Alternatively, or in addition, a buyer may be obligated to make 
                                                            
 49. Declaration of Professor Einer Elhauge on Behalf of Eisai Inc. ¶ 3, 
Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Adventis LLC, No. 3:08 Civ. 4168 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2008) 
(“[A] monopolist can get buyers to agree to be loyal for a nominal “discount” 
from the price charged disloyal buyers, even though the result of all them 
agreeing is that they exclude the monopolist’s rivals and then pay higher 
prices than the but-for competitive price they would have paid.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Scott-Morton, supra note 8, at 9 (“[M]arket share discounts 
can allow the dominant firm to reduce output while at the same time 
restricting the buyer’s ability to consume more from rivals.”). 
 51. See Sprint Corporation, Ex Parte Letter in Special Access for Price 
Cap Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 05-25 & RM-10593 (Sept. 23, 
2015), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001325247.pdf (describing how Sprint has 
purchased “costly but pointless” special access circuits from ILECs to avoid 
paying shortfall penalties under its contract). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally Zenger, supra note 45, at 743–44 (explaining how the 
last units sold before the threshold in “retroactive rebate schemes,” i.e. 
rollback discount plans, have a negative marginal price). 
 54. E.g., Declaration of Professor Einer Elhauge on Behalf of Eisai Inc., 
supra note 49, ¶ 3, at 1 (illustrating a hypothetical example of how discounts 
like this may work). For an example of this type of plan, see Greenlee & 
Reitman, supra note 5, at 5 n.8 (explaining that in “dollar-one,” “all-unit,” or 
“rollback” discounts the discount applies to every unit purchased). 
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a fixed dollar payment, or lose a benefit, if it fails to meet the 
purchase requirement.55 
To see how the “tax” works, consider a customer that 
purchases a total of one hundred units (“circuits”) of special 
access from all suppliers. Suppose, further, that under an “all-
units” contract, the customer pays a price of $10 per unit if it 
purchases ninety units from the dominant firm but $11 per 
unit if it makes less than ninety percent of its purchases from 
that firm. If the customer has been purchasing ninety units 
from the dominant firm and then shifts five percent of its total 
purchases to a competitor, purchasing only eighty-five circuits 
from the dominant firm at the renewal of a contract, the total 
“tax” is the increase in price $11 - $10 = $ 1 (the “rollback” of 
the discount) times the number of units that it continues to 
purchase from the dominant firm, eighty-five. This amounts to 
a “tax” of $85, or $17 per unit on the five units purchased from 
the competitor.56 
Suppose, instead, that the penalty takes the form of a fixed 
dollar payment. The effect would be identical in our example if, 
instead of forfeiting a per-unit discount of $1 per unit, the 
buyer was forced to pay a “shortfall” penalty of $85 if its 
purchases from the dominant firm fell to eighty-five percent of 
its total purchases. As Farrell’s analysis shows, the “tax” takes 
the form of a reduction in the average discount, which can be 
effected entirely through a penalty that takes the form of an 
increase in the unit price, or entirely through a fixed dollar 
penalty, or through some combination of the two types of 
penalties.57 
The penalty provision in a loyalty contract can also involve 
conditioning the availability of a benefit on the customer 
committing to making a large share of its purchases from the 
ILEC.58 For example, some special access contracts condition 
                                                            
 55. See Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 116, at 4773–74. 
 56. Note that, in this example, the price of the last five units is actually 
negative since the customer would spend $935 if it purchased eighty- five units 
but only $900 if it purchased ninety units. Thus, the effective unit price of the 
last five units purchased is minus $7 (=-$35/5). 
 57. See Farrell Reply Declaration, supra note 35, ¶¶ 8–11 (illustrating 
how special access contracts condition penalty exemption or discounts on high 
volume purchases that make it “unprofitable for a competitor to win any 
portion of a customer’s business”). 
 58. See id. ¶ 5 (providing an example of benefits conditioned on continued 
large volume purchases). 
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circuit portability—the ability to terminate one special access 
circuit from the ILEC and replace it with another without 
incurring a penalty—on a customer’s commitment to maintain 
a significant share of its historic purchase levels from the 
ILEC.59 These contracts give special access customers the 
incentive to make and maintain high minimum volume 
commitments in order to obtain and retain the benefits of 
circuit portability.60 
B. EXAMPLES OF LOYALTY PROVISIONS IN ILEC SPECIAL 
ACCESS CONTRACTS 
ILECs achieve “loyalty” in a number of ways, including 
term commitments, penalties for early termination, and volume 
purchase commitments in their special access contracts.61 For 
example, “tariff pricing plan provisions . . . are set at high 
levels of purchasers’ previous or existing . . . purchases from 
the incumbent LEC – from [eighty] percent to [ninety-five] 
percent.”62 By committing to these percentages, ILEC 
customers may obtain substantial discounts from “rack 
rates.”63 At least as important, they may obtain benefits in the 
form of circuit portability. The FCC notes, for example, that 
while Pacific Bell Telephone’s and Southwestern Bell Telephone’s 
Term Payment Plans (TPPs) do not impose a percentage commitment 
on purchasers, each TPP contains a circuit portability option that 
imposes such a requirement. Circuit portability provides customers, 
particularly competitive LEC customers, flexibility to disconnect 
circuits and replace them with others to meet their commitments and 
thereby not incur early termination penalties. By most accounts, 
circuit portability provides a crucial non-rate benefit for competitive 
LECs serving retail customers whose terms of service rarely coincide 
with the competitive LECs’ underlying pricing plan term 
commitments with incumbent LECs.64 
                                                            
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. ¶ 11 (arguing that a penalty provision “sets up an automatic 
and sometimes drastic price cut for any portion of the customer’s business that 
the customer is considering switching to a competitor”). 
 61. The examples provided here are not intended to be an exhaustive list 
of the loyalty provisions in ILEC special access contracts. See id. ¶ 5. 
 62. Initiating Order, supra note 21, ¶ 30, at 11431–32. 
 63. See BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 37, at 20 (reporting that over ninety 
percent of Verizon’s special access revenues from other carriers in 2009 were 
received under plans that contained discounts from the rack rates). 
 64. Initiating Order, supra note 21, ¶ 34, at 11433–34 (footnote omitted). 
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Another example of these types of provisions is what the 
FCC refers to as “All-or-Nothing Requirements.” The FCC 
notes that these provisions either “require that customers 
subscribing to one of these plans include all purchases of a 
specific service type, such as DS1 or DS3, in that one plan for 
the duration of that plan” or require “customers to commit all 
of the customer’s relevant type of in-service circuits only at the 
inception of a portability plan or option.”65 According to the 
Commission, 
[i]n either case, customers are unable to choose to keep their 
purchases out of the initial commitment associated with the 
portability plan by making a portion of their purchases on a month-
to-month basis or through a term only plan or another generally 
available pricing plan. This limitation precludes customers from 
managing their business data services purchases in an economically 
efficient manner, restricting how they purchase services from the 
incumbent LEC plans and restricting their ability to consider 
competitive alternatives.66 
Still another example is what the FCC refers to as 
“shortfall penalties,” which it describes as “charges assessed on 
a purchaser . . . if its purchases fall below a percentage-based 
or other volume commitment specified in a tariff pricing plan 
as a precondition for obtaining the pricing plan’s discount or 
circuit portability benefit.”67 The FCC then notes “the wide 
disparity in the amounts of these fees and the methodologies 
used to calculate them.”68 For example, under CenturyLink’s 
Term Discount Plan, “customers that purchase less than their 
agreed to number of circuits for more than ninety days are 
assessed a termination fee for the unused circuits and have 
their commitment levels reduced.”69 Under the Southwestern 
Bell and Pacific Bell Term Payment Plans, “the fee is assessed 
monthly based on the number of shortfall circuits multiplied by 
the non-recurring charge for DS1 channel terminations.”70 
Observing that “[a]lthough competitive carriers today continue 
to rely substantially on incumbent LEC [time-division-
multiplexing] . . . special access services to serve their 
                                                            
 65. Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 96, at 4765. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. ¶ 116, at 4773 (footnote omitted). 
 68. Id. ¶ 118, at 4773–74. 
 69. Id. ¶ 119, at 4775 (footnote omitted). 
 70. Id. ¶ 118, at 4774 (describing a wide range of shortfall penalty 
provisions at ¶¶ 115–122). 
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customers, . . . the telecommunications market is shifting to 
more efficient IP technology based services, such as 
Ethernet.”71 The FCC concludes that “[e]xcessive penalties 
combined with high minimum purchase requirements harm 
competition by preventing competitive LECs from making cost-
based choices about whether and when to transition their 
[time-division-multiplexing] purchases to Ethernet services, 
whether through purchases or construction.”72 
A final example is the use by ILECs of Early Termination 
Penalties. The FCC describes these as “charges assessed on a 
purchaser under business data services tariff pricing plans 
when the purchaser terminates its use of a circuit or circuits 
prior to the expiration of the applicable service term.”73 
According to the FCC, 
AT&T explains that if a purchaser’s TDM DS1 channel termination 
purchases fall below [eighty] percent of the commitment level, the 
purchaser has two options: the purchaser can “‘buy down’ (i.e. 
reduce)” its commitment level or it can pay a shortfall fee. Under the 
“buy down” option, which is equivalent to terminating circuits, the 
purchaser must pay “to AT&T an amount equal to the number of 
decreased DS1 channel terminations multiplied by the month-to-
month rate multiplied by the number of months remaining for the 
portability option.” This provision requires customers that choose to 
buy down their commitment levels to pay a fee based on undiscounted 
month-to-month rates for the terminated circuits.74 
Such provisions discourage customers from shifting special 
access purchases to alternative suppliers even in those cases in 
which these alternatives are available, or will be available, at 
locations that they serve or wish to serve in the future.75 
Importantly, even at the expiration of an ILEC contract 
term, it would be extremely costly for a customer to shift any 
significant portion of its purchases of special access channel 
                                                            
 71. Id. ¶ 129, at 4780 (footnote omitted). 
 72. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 73. Id. ¶ 142, at 4785 (footnote omitted). 
 74. Id. ¶ 146, at 4787 (footnotes omitted). 
 75. Compare id. ¶ 149, at 4788 (“We find early termination penalties 
greater than the revenues the incumbent LECs would have received had the 
purchaser not terminated the service to be unreasonable.”) with id. ¶ 152, at 
4788 (finding that “a reasonable early termination fee should be set at a level 
no greater than the amount of revenue a customer would have paid had it met 
is minimum commitment”). 
16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 20 
 
terminations to ILEC rivals.76 During the period from the end 
of the ILEC contract until the initiation of service from a 
competitor, the customer would be required to pay the ILEC’s 
extremely high month-to-month rate.77 At locations where the 
ILEC controls the only last mile facilities, it could be many 
months until a competitive provider could deploy its own last 
mile facilities and initiate service.78 Moreover, even at those 
locations where a competitor has already deployed last mile 
facilities, the transition of customers from the ILEC’s network 
can be extremely burdensome. The FCC itself has noted that 
“moving purchases to alternative providers and building 
replacement network facilities requires long term planning and 
happens over an extended period of time.”79 In this regard, the 
FCC has noted that 
[a] customer planning to move purchases to other options following 
the end of a term plan, because of the all-or-nothing provisions, must 
either pay month to month rates for all of its purchases while it 
transitions its circuits, or commit to a portability plan with a high 
commitment level that limits the amount of circuits it can remove 
from the incumbent LEC’s network without penalty through the next 
term or (2) choose term commitments for all its circuits and forgo 
circuit portability for those circuits where it would be the most cost 
effective plan. Accordingly, customers are constrained in controlling 
                                                            
 76. See id. ¶ 483, at 4893 (discussing incumbent LEC pricing plans that 
commonly contain provisions related to the expiration of a purchaser’s 
agreement that “may impose unreasonable constraints on purchasers whose 
agreements have expired in light of the long term nature of broadband service 
agreements and the substantial logistics required to move purchases to other 
providers or construct facilities to self-provision”). 
 77. See id. ¶ 482, at 4893 (“Competitive LECs have asserted certain 
provisions in incumbent LEC tariff pricing plans that apply upon expiration of 
a purchaser’s agreement . . . . These provisions include requirements . . . that 
force buyers to pay higher, undiscounted month-to-month rates immediately 
upon expiration of an agreement.”). 
 78. Cf. id. ¶ 55, at 4747 (“The decision to build or lease last-mile facilities 
generally occurs on a case-by-case basis when there is an interested potential 
customer. Whether to build a lateral connection can depend on a variety of 
factors, including the distance of a building to the competitive provider’s 
existing network facilities, the density of business location near the targeted 
location—especially the number of nearby multiple tenant buildings, the 
potential return on investment given the customer’s service demand (e.g., 
revenues tend to increase with the customer’s bandwidth demands), the term 
of the agreement with the customer, access to rights-of-way, and the ability to 
access buildings, among other factors.”). 
 79. Id. ¶ 104, at 4769 (footnote omitted). 
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and reducing their purchase commitments under the all-or-nothing 
plans.80 
Verizon claims that a customer can remain on an expiring 
plan for a two-month “grace period” and manage its transition 
to an alternative wholesale provider during this brief window.81 
However, in light of the factors described above, many 
customers have concluded that such a period would likely be 
far too short for them to switch to non-ILEC facilities at a 
significant number of locations.82 
Together, these factors—percentage commitments, all-or-
nothing requirements, shortfall penalties, penalties for early 
termination, and others—explain why many ILEC customers 
have been unable to shift more than a modest portion of their 
requirements for special access service to alternative 
suppliers.83 These customers can retain the flexibility to shift 
purchases to alternative suppliers, thereby subjecting ILECs to 
effective competition, only if they pay rates that exceed, by a 
wide margin, the rates that are available under ILEC contracts 
that do not provide that flexibility and/or if they forgo other 
contractual benefits, such as circuit portability.84 
C. HOW ILEC LOYALTY CONTRACTS CAN LEAD TO HIGHER 
SPECIAL ACCESS RATES 
There are a number of mechanisms that can lead to higher 
special access rates when firms must effectively purchase a 
large percentage of their total requirements from the ILEC in 
order to avoid the penalty provisions in ILEC loyalty contracts. 
First, note that the demand curve faced by the ILEC is the 
market demand curve for special access minus the total 
quantity that other (“fringe”) suppliers would supply at each 
price. However, if the buyer must purchase a large share of its 
historic purchase volume from the ILEC in order to avoid a 
“tax,” the quantity that can be sold by the fringe at any price is 
                                                            
 80. Id. ¶ 104, at 4769–70 (footnote omitted). 
 81. See Verizon, Ex Parte Letter in Special Access Rates for Price Cap 
Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 05-25 & RM-10593 at 4 (Mar. 26, 
2015), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001041478.pdf. 
 82. See, e.g., tw telecom inc., Ex Parte Letter in Special Access Rates for 
Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 05-25 & RM-10593 at 7 
(August 21, 2012), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7022007243.pdf. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 149, at 4788. 
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reduced, so that the demand curve faced by the ILEC becomes 
less elastic. As a result, the ILEC is able to profitably raise its 
price. 
Second, limiting the sales of rival suppliers of special 
access can deny them economies of scale, thus raising their 
costs. Elhauge puts it this way: 
Suppose [that] . . . [o]ther firms stand poised to enter the market, or 
to expand until they achieve sufficient scale to reduce their costs 
to . . . [those of the monopolist], in which case competition will drive 
prices down to . . . [the monopolist’s cost]. To prevent this competitive 
outcome, the monopolist announces a loyalty program . . . . As a 
result, rivals cannot enter, or expand enough to achieve their 
minimum efficient scale, and the buyers all continue to pay the 
monopoly price . . . which is . . . [higher than] the . . . price they would 
have paid but for the loyalty program.85 
In this case, contracts that limit purchases from rival 
suppliers of special access in some geographic areas may limit 
their ability to expand into other areas by denying them the 
scale economies that they need to compete. 
Finally, loyalty contracts may have longer-term effects. 
Rival suppliers of special access may not undertake current 
investments that would reduce their costs in the future, thus 
reducing their ability to compete at locations where they do not 
currently provide service, because they anticipate that future 
sales at those locations will be too small to justify such 
investments.86 
In summary, by using special access loyalty contracts to 
discourage customers from purchasing service from rivals, an 
ILEC can make the demand that it faces less elastic, thus 
permitting it to charge higher prices.87 It can also deny 
economies of scale to its rivals and discourage R&D 
expenditures than can lower rivals’ costs, thus either creating a 
cost advantage for the ILEC, or increasing any cost advantage 
that it might otherwise have had.88 Because special access 
                                                            
 85. Declaration of Professor Einer Elhauge on Behalf of Eisai Inc., supra 
note 49, ¶ 109, at 65. 
 86. See id. at 68–69. 
 87. See id. ¶ 111, at 66 (“[A] monopolist can get buyers to agree to be loyal 
for a nominal ‘discount’ from the price charged disloyal buyers, even though 
the result of all them agreeing is that they exclude the monopolist’s rivals and 
then pay higher prices than the but-for competitive price they would have 
paid.”). 
 88. See id. ¶ 114, at 67 (“[T]he foreclosure created by the loyalty contracts 
may prevent such rivals from expanding and achieving economies of scale. In 
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rivals are less able to compete, the ILEC is able to increase its 
rates.89 
III. MANY ILEC LOYALTY PROVISIONS DO NOT HAVE 
EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATIONS 
Many of the highly restrictive provisions that customers 
must accept in order to obtain significant discounts from the 
(undiscounted) month-to-month rates, to obtain other 
contractual benefits, or to avoid penalty provisions, cannot be 
justified by any efficiencies associated with those terms.90 As 
explained above, many ILEC special access contracts effectively 
require the customer to continue to make purchases that are a 
very large percentage of its historic purchases from the ILEC in 
order to receive a discount from the month-to-month rates or to 
obtain other contractual benefits.91 Under the terms of these 
contracts, two customers that purchase the same percentage of 
their historic levels from the ILEC receive the same percentage 
discount or other benefits even if the numbers of circuits that 
they purchase are vastly different.92 Alternatively, two 
customers that purchase the same number of circuits can 
obtain vastly different discounts or benefits if the percentages 
of their historic purchase levels are vastly different.93 To the 
extent that there are economies of scale in the provision of 
special access, those economies are more likely to depend on 
the number of circuits purchased by a customer than on the 
percentage of the customer’s historic purchases that these 
                                                            
addition, excluding rivals who would never be equally efficient also can cause 
anticompetitive harm by reducing constraints on monopoly pricing.”). 
 89. See id. ¶ 111, at 66. 
 90. Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 234, at 4829 (“The 
resulting higher downstream prices, therefore, offset any claimed efficiencies 
brought by the so-called lock-in requirements.”). Although penalties for early 
termination are not necessarily inefficient, the manner in which they are 
imposed by ILECs does raise efficiency concerns. See id. ¶¶ 234–36, at 4828–
30. We discuss this issue in detail below when we consider possible remedies 
to encourage the competitive supply of special access. 
 91. Cf. Farrell Reply Declaration, supra note 35, ¶¶ 11–15 (“[I]n some 
circumstances a customer switching a part of its business to a non-ILEC 
provider could lose not only the discount on the portion switched, but also the 
MVP discount on the portion that remained with the ILEC.”). 
 92. Stanley M. Besen and Bridger M. Mitchell, Appendix A to Comments 
of BT Americas, et al. on Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange 
Carriers, WC Docket No. 05-25 & RM-10593, at 23–24 (Feb. 11, 2013). 
 93. Id. 
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circuits represent and thus to be unrelated to the amount of 
service purchased from other suppliers.94 
Moreover, the percentage purchase condition is often 
imposed on purchases in each of a number of widely dispersed 
geographic areas within an ILEC service territory.95 In order to 
obtain a discount or other benefit in any area that the ILEC 
serves, an ILEC contract may require a customer to meet a 
percentage purchase condition that applies to the ILEC’s entire 
territory, generally including areas in several states.96 Thus, 
even if one geographic area within this territory were to 
experience robust competition, under the contract, a customer 
must purchase all or a very large proportion of its requirements 
in that area from the ILEC in order to obtain the discount on 
ILEC service in other areas in the territory where competition 
is less intense. It is highly unlikely that an ILEC’s costs in 
providing special access to a particular customer in one of its 
service areas are affected to any significant degree by the 
percentage of a customer’s special access services that it 
provides in another area.97 Such contracts are likely to 
discourage rivals from entering individual ILEC service areas 
even when they are more efficient suppliers and to discourage 
them from making investments that would eventually make 
them significant rivals throughout an ILEC’s entire service 
area. 
                                                            
 94. For this reason, Verizon’s claim that “selling in greater bulk creates 
efficiencies by, among other things, reducing the number of individual 
transactions needed to sell a specified volume,” although it might justify a 
lower price for a larger commitment volume, does not justify lower prices for a 
larger commitment percentage. See id. But see Letter from Donna Epps, Vice 
President, Fed. Regulatory Affairs, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n 7 (Mar. 27, 2012). 
 95. See Letter from Donna Epps, supra note 94, at 11. 
 96. See Sprint Corporation, Ex Parte Letter, supra note 51 (arguing that 
the discounted rates offered as an alternative to the unaffordable month-to-
month rates are supposedly reduced rates but are inflated, and that the ILECs 
attach anti-competitive contractual terms to the discounted rates such as 
these purchase conditions). 
 97. For example, AT&T’s provision of special access circuits to a customer 
in Florida is highly unlikely to in any way affect the costs that AT&T incurs 
when providing special access circuits to the same customer in North 
Carolina, and vice versa. However, in order to receive circuit portability in 
either one of these states, the customer must commit to a volume commitment 
that applies throughout legacy BellSouth territory, which includes both of 
these states. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
TARIFF, F.C.C. NO. 1 § 2.4.8(B) (2013)  
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The barrier to entry may be especially significant if the 
rival serves only a portion of the ILEC’s service territory but 
the customer needs facilities in other parts of the territory as 
well. If the rival cannot serve the customer’s requirements in 
all areas, loyalty contracts may prevent it from serving those 
requirements in any area and, even where entry is not 
completely foreclosed, the contract provisions can significantly 
limit the share of the requirements that the rival is able to 
serve.98 
Although the ILECs have claimed a number of efficiency 
justifications for the loyalty provisions in their special access 
contracts, the FCC has rejected many of these.99 In addition, as 
we discuss below, we believe that economic efficiency requires 
that the penalties in ILEC special access contracts should be 
limited to customer-specific sunk costs, whereas the FCC 
argues that economically efficient penalties should be based on 
expected revenues.100 Under the standard that we have 
proposed, the ILECs would have even more difficulty in 
justifying these penalties than under the one employed by the 
FCC. 
IV. LOYALTY CONTRACT PROVISIONS IN OTHER 
MARKETS 
Concerns about the competitive implications of loyalty 
contract provisions are not limited to the telecommunications 
market for special access services. For example, in the 
                                                            
 98. See Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 95, at 4764–65. 
 99. See, e.g., id. ¶ 99, at 4767 (“Neither Verizon nor AT&T, CenturyLink, 
and Frontier provided more detailed business justifications for their all-or-
nothing requirements other than general business arguments that their terms 
and conditions are necessary to reduce cost or ensure predictability, certainty, 
or efficiency.”) (footnote omitted); id. ¶ 108, at 4771 (“Verizon has not 
established, nor have we found, a rationale that would support a finding that 
including that circuit in a portability plan would provide Verizon with 
increased certainty for that circuit. For the same reasons, we find the general 
assertions by AT&T, CenturyLink, and Frontier that such requirements are 
necessary to ensure predictability, certainty, or efficiency are insufficient to 
establish the reasonableness of the constraints these provisions impose on 
their customers”); id. ¶ 130, at 4780 (“The incumbent LECs have failed to 
provide any concrete cost or economic justification for [the shortfall] fees in 
response to our requirement that they provide for such support to justify the 
fees.”). 
 100. See id. ¶ 133, at 4781 (arguing that revenue-based penalties allow 
“economically efficient breach”). 
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microprocessor market, Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”) 
brought suit against Intel accusing it, among other things, of 
using “discriminatory rebates, discounts and subsidies 
conditioned on customer ‘loyalty’ that have the practical and 
intended effect of creating exclusive or near-exclusive dealing 
arrangements . . . .”101 According to AMD, “Intel’s is a system of 
‘penetration’ or ‘loyalty’ rebates designed to exclude AMD from 
a substantial portion of the market. Intel intentionally sets a 
rebate trigger at a level of purchases it knows to constitute a 
dominant percentage of a customer’s needs.”102 In the 
settlement of the case, which also involved the settlement of 
several other lawsuits, Intel agreed to pay AMD $1.25 billion 
and agreed to a set of conditions, including that it would not 
offer customers inducements in exchange for purchasing all of 
their microprocessor needs from Intel.103 
In settling a complaint brought by the Federal Trade 
Commission, Transitions Optical, Inc., agreed, among other 
things, to stop “offering market share discounts that are based 
on what percentage of a customer’s photochromic lens sales are 
Transitions’ lenses.”104 In a recently adjudicated case, Meritor 
claimed that Eaton’s practices, which included a provision 
under which a purchaser of truck transmissions “would only 
receive rebates if it purchased a specified percentage of its 
requirements from Eaton,” were anticompetitive.105 The Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that “Plaintiffs 
presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that 
Eaton engaged in anticompetitive conduct and that Plaintiffs 
suffered antitrust injury as result.”106 
                                                            
 101. Complaint ¶ 35, In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 258 
F.R.D. 280 (D. Del. 2008), 2005 WL 1838069. 
 102. Id. ¶ 60. For a discussion of the case, see Joseph Farrell, Janis 
Pappalardo & Howard Shelanski, Economics at the FTC: Mergers, Dominant-
Firm Conduct, and Consumer Behavior, 37 REV. INDUS. ORG. 263 (2010). 
 103. See Stephen Shankland, Intel to Pay AMD $1.25 Billion in Antitrust 
Settlement, CNET, (Nov. 12, 2009, 11:17 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
1001_3-10396188-92.html. 
 104. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Bars Transitions Optical, 
Inc. from Using Anticompetitive Tactics to Maintain its Monopoly in 
Darkening Treatments for Eyeglass Lenses (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/03/optical.shtm. 
 105. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 106. Id. at 303. 
2018] CONTRACTS THAT IMPEDE ENTRY 23 
 
Finally, in the pulse oximetry market, Masimo challenged 
a number of Tyco’s business practices. In upholding a lower 
court decision in favor of Masimo, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found that “the district court properly 
determined that a reasonable jury, based on the evidence 
offered at trial, could have concluded Tyco’s sole source and 
market share agreements violated the antitrust laws.”107 
V. FCC ACTIONS REGARDING ILEC SPECIAL ACCESS 
SERVICE CONTRACTS 
As noted above, in 2016, the FCC took actions that were 
intended to limit the use of loyalty provisions in ILEC special 
access contracts. It began its analysis by describing what it 
called “all-or-nothing” provisions in these contracts. It noted 
that these contracts 
require customers to commit all their relevant in-service purchases, 
such as DS1 or DS3 channel terminations, to a single pricing plan, 
which limits the ability of customers to allocate their purchases 
across different plans. All-or-nothing requirements generally work in 
conjunction with circuit portability plans or options, which enable 
customers to avoid early termination fees when disconnecting 
individual circuits before their term commitments expire, provided 
they commit to maintaining a high percentage of their initial volume 
commitment over the duration of a plan. The fact that competitive 
LECs typically require portability for some significant portion of their 
purchases means that they usually must commit all their purchases 
to a portability plan regardless of their overall portability needs. 
Competitive LECs that make this choice are precluded from selecting 
tariff purchase options generally available to all customers. All-or-
nothing requirements thus “lock up” all of a customer’s purchases, 
limiting its ability to minimize the amount of its purchases subject to 
high percentage and longer term commitments and restricting its 
ability to migrate its purchases to alternative providers or to self-
provision using its own facilities.108 
The FCC also found that 
customers are unable to choose to keep their purchases out of the 
initial commitment associated with the portability plan by making a 
portion of their purchases on a month-to-month basis or through a 
term only plan or another generally available pricing plan. This 
limitation precludes customers from managing their business data 
services purchases in an economically efficient manner, restricting 
                                                            
 107. Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., 350 F. App’x 95, 97–98 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 108. Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶ 95, at 4764–65 (footnote 
omitted). 
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how they purchase services from the incumbent LEC plans and 
restricting their ability to consider competitive alternatives. We 
determine that these tariff provisions are anti-competitive and 
unreasonable because they restrict a customer’s purchase option 
without a corresponding reasonable business concern.109 
The FCC also addressed the reasonableness of “shortfall 
penalties”; costs that special access customers incur if they fail 
to purchase the amounts of services for which they had initially 
contracted.110 It found “the need to set a reasonable limit on 
shortfall fees . . . . Excessive penalties combined with high 
minimum purchase requirements harm competition by 
preventing competitive LECs from making cost-based choices 
about whether and when to transition their TDM purchases to 
Ethernet services, whether through purchases or 
construction.”111 
The FCC found that shortfall penalties in some ILEC 
contracts are reasonable so long as they do not exceed the 
amount that a customer would have paid had it met its 
purchase commitment.112 However, it also found that “[t]o the 
extent such fees impose costs on the customer beyond the 
provider’s opportunity cost, such costs will unreasonably limit 
the customer’s ability to make efficient choices and impede 
technology transitions.”113 
The FCC explicitly rejected a proposal by special access 
customers to limit these penalties to the “customer-specific 
sunk costs associated with providing a circuit.”114 It observed, 
however, that 
[s]ome commenters suggest that early termination fees could be 
calculated on the basis of costs instead of on revenue expectations. We 
note that this would be a rational approach to setting early 
termination fee levels that would likely yield lower fees, particularly 
given that the incumbent LECs have been able to charge for those 
facilities over a number of years and are also likely to have fully 
depreciated them on their books. The challenges of assigning costs in 
a customer specific fashion, however, make implementation of a cost-
based methodology unrealistic.115 
                                                            
 109. Id. ¶ 96, at 4765. 
 110. Id. ¶ 116, at 4773 (footnote omitted). 
 111. Id. ¶ 129, at 4780. 
 112. Id. ¶ 132, at 4781. 
 113. Id. ¶ 117, at 4773. 
 114. Id. at 4789 n.396. We discuss below why we challenge that conclusion. 
 115. Id. ¶ 157, at 4790 (footnotes omitted). 
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Nonetheless, the FCC also determined that “[a]ny 
incumbent LEC seeking to raise its early termination fees will 
be required to make a cost-based showing in support of any 
such filing . . . any such cost showing should account for costs 
savings that result from the early termination.”116 
The FCC also found that some early termination penalties 
were unreasonable.117 Specifically, it found that, “[e]xcessive 
penalties combined with long term commitments harm 
competition by preventing competitive LECs from making 
efficient cost-based choices about whether and when to 
transition their TDM purchases to Ethernet services, whether 
through purchases or construction.”118 
The FCC concluded that “a reasonable early termination 
fee should be set at a level no greater than the amount of 
revenue a customer would have paid had it met its minimum 
commitment.”119 However, it identified a number of cases in 
which these fees “exceed the incumbent LECs’ revenue 
expectations.”120 The FCC then described “two methods of 
calculating a reasonable maximum early termination fee that 
would reflect expectation damages.”121 However, as it did in the 
case of shortfall penalties, it concluded that “[a]ny incumbent 
LEC seeking to raise its early termination fee will be required 
to make a cost-based showing in support of any such 
filing . . . .”122 
Although these regulations would have gone some way 
toward removing the anticompetitive effects of provisions in 
LEC special access contracts, in the following year the FCC 
withdrew them.123 In her Dissent to the Commission’s Order, 
Commissioner Clyburn noted that 
                                                            
 116. Id. ¶ 156, at 4789–90 (footnote omitted). 
 117. Id. ¶ 148, at 4787. 
 118. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 119. Id. ¶ 152, at 4788. 
 120. Id. ¶ 146, at 4787. 
 121. Id. ¶ 156, at 4789 (footnote omitted). 
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 123. Id. ¶ 141, at 4784–85. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit recently rejected most of the challenges to the Commission’s 
Order. Citizens Telecomm. Co. of Minn. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 901 F.3d 
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rulemaking, and its notice was insufficient” and, on that basis, the Court 
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[e]ven in non-competitive areas, the majority declines to take action 
against anticompetitive conditions in contracts and tariffs. These 
include all-or-nothing requirements, which preclude purchasers from 
selecting purchase options generally available in tariffs to all 
customers. Or, punitive shortfall and early termination penalties that 
exceed expectation damages which will lock up the market and force 
purchasers to stay in contracts. And finally, there are tying 
arrangements that require a purchaser to buy competitive services in 
conjunction with noncompetitive services. Particularly in an 
effectively deregulated nationwide market, these provisions could 
essentially be wielded to undermine nascent competition and to 
consolidate market power.124 
VI. CONTRACTUAL PENALTIES SHOULD BE BASED ON 
CUSTOMER-SPECIFIC SUNK COSTS 
The efficiency justification for term commitments (and 
non-recurring charges) in special access contracts is the need 
for a carrier to recover its customer-specific sunk costs.125 
These are the costs of deploying those facilities that are used to 
serve a particular customer irrespective of the volume of 
service that it takes and that cannot be shifted to serve a 
different customer if the customer ceases taking the service.126 
Customer-specific sunk costs are thus distinguished both from 
costs that can be avoided if the quantity purchased by a 
customer is reduced and from costs for facilities that can 
potentially be used by a different customer if the customer 
ceases taking the service.127 
The FCC initially established ceilings for shortfall and 
early termination penalties based on ILEC expected 
revenues.128 We take issue with its approach and instead 
propose that those penalties should be limited to recovery of 
customer-specific sunk costs.129 Under this approach, an ILEC’s 
one-time, nonrecurring charge for a special access circuit would 
be no higher than the customer-specific sunk costs of providing 
                                                            
vacated those portions of the final rule and remanded them to the FCC for 
further proceedings. Id. at 1005. 
 124. Business Data Services in an Internet Protocol Environment, 32 FCC 
Rcd. 3459, 3651 (Clyburn, Comm’r., dissenting). 
 125. Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 99, 108, at 4767, 4771. 
 126. See Declaration of Besen & Mitchell, supra note 92, ¶ 56. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Tariff Investigation Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 153-54, at 4789. 
 129. Of course, we are even more critical of the Commission’s decision to 
eliminate these ceilings altogether. 
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the circuit.130 Similarly, under our approach, an ILEC’s 
required term commitment for a special access circuit would 
have a duration no longer than is needed to recover the 
customer-specific sunk costs of providing the circuit, and a 
penalty for terminating a circuit prior to expiration of the term 
would be no higher than the amount of such costs that remain 
unrecovered at the time of termination.131 When a carrier 
incurs customer-specific sunk costs, it can legitimately expect 
to recover those costs during the duration of its contract with 
that customer,132 and we do not dispute Verizon’s claim that it 
needs to “recover the costs associated with deploying 
facilities . . . .”133 The relevant questions are the magnitude of 
those costs and the manner in which they are recovered.134 
Under our proposal, when such costs exist, instead of incurring 
higher recurring monthly payments, the customer should have 
the option of paying for them in the form of a non-recurring 
charge and no term requirement.135 If a customer has paid a 
non-recurring charge for the costs that are specific to it and 
that cannot be recovered if the customer were to cease taking a 
service, the ILEC will have already recovered those costs in the 
non-recurring charge and there is no justification for imposing 
a minimum contract term or for imposing a charge if the 
customer fails to use the service for a minimum period of 
time.136 Indeed, the FCC itself has noted that 
no incumbent LEC has provided an explanation of or identified any 
costs it incurs when a customer fails to meet its percentage 
commitments that are greater than the costs it would incur in 
providing the service under terms of the tariff. We further find it 
likely that, consistent with the assertions of their competitive LEC 
customers, the providing incumbent LEC avoids certain costs when it 
does not provide a service.137 
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 133. Declaration of Quinn Lew & Anthony Recine, Attachment B on 
Verizon Reply Comments on Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local 
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Whether a particular termination penalty provision is 
efficient will depend on the extent to which the ILEC incurs 
sunk costs to serve the specific customer.138 Notably, the ILEC 
investments in the facilities that supply virtually all DS1 
channel termination circuits have been sunk before an 
additional customer is served.139 At most user locations, legacy 
ILEC special access facilities exist.140 As a result, the 
additional costs incurred by an ILEC for connecting a customer 
to those DS1 channel termination circuits are likely to be 
modest and to consist primarily of changing software settings 
and physically cross-connecting existing lines at the customer’s 
building. ILECs could easily recover these costs in the form of 
non-recurring charges.141 In such cases, imposing significant 
early termination charges serves only to prevent customers 
from switching to an ILEC rival in the future and has no 
efficiency justification.142 
Even where the ILEC incurs substantial customer-specific 
sunk costs to provide a new customer circuit, without imposing 
very large termination penalties it could still protect against 
the risk of early termination by giving the customer the option 
of making either: (1) an up-front payment equal to those 
customer-specific sunk costs, or (2) recurring payments that 
amortize these costs provided that any remaining payments 
would be due if the customer were to terminate the contract 
before its completion. By tying any termination payment to the 
sunk costs that are actually incurred by the ILEC, the payment 
cannot be used to discourage the customer from switching to a 
more efficient rival. 
Customers that choose not to pay the non-recurring cost in 
the form of an upfront charge should pay the same monthly 
charge as customers that do choose to pay the non-recurring 
charge plus an amount that is equivalent, in present value, to 
the non-recurring charge that they would otherwise pay. 
Indeed, customers could be given the option of paying the 
customer-specific sunk costs over any fixed period, including a 
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period that is shorter than the life of its contract with the 
ILEC, in which case the charge for the sunk costs would be 
eliminated when those costs had been recovered. In this way, a 
customer can be free to purchase from an ILEC rival without 
penalty by making its payment for any customer-specific costs 
over a relatively short period. In any event, there is no 
efficiency justification for a charge that exceeds the ILEC’s 
customer-specific sunk costs, whether it is imposed on a non-
recurring or a monthly basis. 
Moreover, by separating ILEC cost recovery into customer-
specific sunk costs and ongoing costs, it would be easier to 
determine whether the non-recurring charge that is being 
demanded is commensurate with a reasonable estimate of the 
sunk costs, something that is obscured in current contractual 
arrangements. It also makes it easier to determine whether the 
term requirement that is being demanded by the ILEC is 
justified by its need to “recover the costs associated with 
deploying facilities.”143 If these costs are modest, the required 
term for a customer that does not choose the upfront payment 
option should be short and, in these circumstances, more 
customers would be likely to choose the upfront payment 
option.144 Tariffs that provide a large discount only for 
customers that accept a long contract term, are economically 
efficient only if customer-specific sunk costs are large. 
In fact, under many ILEC contracts, even if customer-
specific sunk costs are a very small percentage of the total 
revenue that would be generated if the customer completes its 
contract term, the early termination penalty can be 
substantial.145 Thus, unless the shortfall occurs very close to 
the expiration of the contract term, the penalty would almost 
certainly exceed the customer-specific sunk costs incurred by 
the carrier. The only possible purpose of this provision is to 
prevent a customer from shifting purchases to a rival during 
the term of its contract with the ILEC. 
                                                            
 143. Declaration of Lew & Recine, supra note 133, ¶ 28. 
 144. A reasonable level for the non-recurring charge can be established 
using an average of customer-specific sunk costs, based on a straightforward 
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Tying a customer’s early termination penalty to the 
revenues that the ILEC would have received if the customer 
had completed its contract term is not efficient since those 
revenues may bear little or no relationship to the customer-
specific sunk costs that the ILEC incurs in serving that 
customer.146 To illustrate this point, consider an ILEC 
customer for which customer-specific sunk costs are 10 and 
which has a multi-year contract with the ILEC that, if 
completed, would generate revenues of 100. Now suppose that 
a rival is willing to sell the same service over the same period 
for 60. If the customer switches to the rival’s service and if it 
must reimburse the ILEC only for its sunk costs, the customer 
realizes a benefit of (100-60-10) = 30, so it will benefit from a 
contract breach. Of course, the ILEC can prevent the breach by 
matching the rival’s price. 
Suppose, instead, that the customer must reimburse the 
ILEC for its lost revenues. In that case, the customer would 
save 40 by switching to the rival but it must pay the ILEC 100 
as a penalty. Faced with this net loss of 60, it will not breach 
despite the fact that the rival may be a more efficient supplier. 
Contrary to the FCC’s claim, a contract that requires the 
breaching party to pay more than customer specific sunk costs 
may discourage efficient breach. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The terms and conditions in ILEC special access contracts 
provide especially graphic examples of the use of loyalty 
contracts by incumbent firms. These contracts contain a wide 
range of conditions, including minimum purchase 
requirements, long contract terms, and “all-or-nothing 
provisions” and, when these conditions are not met, they 
impose a wide range of “taxes” on purchases from rival 
suppliers, including both monetary payments and the loss of 
valuable benefits. Moreover, these conditions have few, if any, 
efficiency justifications and are imposed by firms with large 
market shares, so that they are especially likely to discourage 
entry by more efficient rivals. Moreover, even the recently 
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eliminated FCC regulations that would have prohibited some of 
the terms of ILEC loyalty contracts would not have prevented 
contract conditions based on market shares or that imposed 
penalties based on ILEC expected revenues instead of 
customer-specific sunk costs. Especially with the complete 
elimination of these regulations, the terms and conditions in 
ILEC special access contracts will continue to impose barriers 
to entry by more efficient rivals. 
 
 
